The flexibility of Android is mainly based on the cross application (app for short) access mechanism. Aside from providing convenience for both app developers and users, such a mechanism also brings the data in external storage which originally regarded harmless into serious privacy breaches. In this paper, we studied various popular apps and developed three different attacks leveraging the public information freely available to zero-permission apps. The first attack can smuggle out the sensitive data which reveals the victim's profile information directly, such as real name, phone number, email address, social networking accounts, etc. With the help of image comparing techniques and current social networking services, we can find out the owners of the phone numbers acquired from a victim's WhatsApp with a high probability. Moreover, the location of the victim is also not spared in the disaster. Comparing to the previous location inferring attacks, our approach is more general since the victim's identity is also acquired by our attack. These three attacks reveal the privacy risks of external storage are much more serious than people previously thought and need to be addressed urgently. In fact, all these threats are caused by the file system used by external storage which calls into question the reasonability of the assumptions on the cross app access mechanism. To the end, we propose a preliminary mitigation approach to achieve a delicate balance between utility and privacy of the data stored in external storage.
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the improvement of the performance and functionality of smartphone has made it a life necessity. The rise of mobile apps also greatly extends capabilities of smartphone: almost everything requiring desktop computers can be now handled on the portable devices. According to the statistics from IDC [5] , about 1 billion smartphones are shipped in 2013. Of all the shipped units, Android has been installed on 793.6 million units, dominating the smartphone market. Android platform is well-known for the variety of apps. In fact, there are more than 1 million apps provided through the official market (Google Play), together with a Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Copyright 20XX ACM X-XXXXX-XX-X/XX/XX ...$15.00.
huge number of apps offered by 3rd-party market. These Android apps bring in more features to the smartphone but at the same time pose grave threats to users' privacy.
Android's security mechanism is designed and implemented in two layers. The first layer is inherited from Linux, including the access-control mechanism on users and file systems. The second layer is introduced by Android, including separating apps by user and group identifiers. Apps are not allowed to exchange data or access critical resources unless they are granted with the corresponding permissions from the user explicitly. Unfortunately, the security mechanism of Android is far from perfect. In recent years, researchers have identified critical security issues on Android, like permission misusing [24] and privilege escalation [17] .
Apparently, the data protected by permissions should be more sensitive to the users. However, recent study shows it is also feasible to obtain or infer sensitive information without requesting any permission [14, 44] . Typically, the data can be accessed without permission falls into two categories. one is the unprotected shared resources inherited from Linux, such as proc files, which can be leveraged by a malicious app to infer a lot of user activities, like which page the user is browsing [30] ; the other is the data generated by apps which are stored in external storage. However, nearly all known attacks are targeting those unprotected shared resources. The risks of the data on external storage are not well studied, as in principle, the external storage should not hold private information and therefore it should raise less security concern [44] .
Information leaks from external storage. In this paper, we ask these questions: what kind of data is kept in external storage? Is the data sensitive to user or can it be leveraged to infer the users' private information? To answer these questions, we first investigated various apps' data stored in external storage, and found out common data like cache, log, account, image and audio are stored there. These sorts of data are considered non-sensitive by the app developers, and there is no direct link between them and the user: the names of the files just consist of random numbers and characters. To reduce the potential threats to users' privacy, Android adds a new permission READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE (READ for short) to protect the privacy of data stored in external storage from Android 4.1. But Android must consider the backwards compatibility. After our investigation on 30 Android smartphones we can reach in our daily life, we found the external storage of all the 30 smartphones can be accessed without any permission.
In our research, based on the sensitive data acquired from users, we achieved a series of attacks against them and even their friends. For example, we can acquire a few phone numbers from someone's WhatsApp, just adding the phone numbers to our contact list, we can get the profile photos of their owners. Frankly speaking, in spite of getting the phone numbers and their corresponding photos, it is not a big privacy issue, since you don't know who is the owner of each photo. However, we can also get a user's identity information from the data stored in external storage generated by some other apps. By comparing these photos with the ones crawling from her social networks, we can find the owners of these phone numbers with a high probability, which leads to a serious attack on users' privacy.
Our study. Here, we carry out an in-depth study over the privacy issues on external storage. After investigating various properties of external storage, such as file system, compatibility with peripheral devices, etc., we found the compatibility is achieved at the cost of information leakage, since the file system used by external storage (FAT32) lacks the fine grained security mechanism which makes apps can access other apps' data very easily. In this paper, we present three attacks leveraging the data in external storage which reveal the threats to users' privacy are much more serious than our thought. These risks call for the mitigation from both Android and app developers.
We focus on privacy risks of the data produced by apps and stored in external storage. Our investigation on various popular apps show that many apps leave sensitive information on external storage, such as WhatsApp, Tencent QQ, Momo, Renren, Alipay, Yixin, build-in camera, and etc. The privacy on the external storage can be extracted by another malicious app and exfiltrated to a remote server without any permission. We demonstrate through several attacks that the information matters to the user, like real name, phone number, email address, social networking accounts, calling histories are within the reach of attackers, posing severe risks to the users. Moreover, by using the image comparing technique, we are able to identify the real identity of the people in her contacts, especially from an app named WhatsApp. Finally, we show the location of user can also be inferred directly (Momo) or indirectly (WeChat).
Such three attacks reveal the real situation is so serious which seems out of people's imagination. The data is harmless only thought by the app itself, standing on a global view, a huge information leakage can be found. Even though one app only leaks a little things, it will be a big surprise when we combine these little things together. Some other techniques can also be leveraged to help our attacks, such as network capture technique, compilation/decompilation technique. To this end, we proposed a relatively practical approach to enhance the privacy protection of external storage, while also keep its compatibility. Our study can help the Android developers have a better trade-off between system utility and data protection, and also warn the app vendors take privacy problems more seriously when they develop various apps.
Our Contributions. We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We systematic analyzed the app data storage on Android, especially what data will be placed in external storage.
• We pointed out the file system (FAT32) used by external storage is the root reason which leads to all these privacy disclosure risks, and analyzed why even if Google was perfectly aware of these threats, it could not find a sound solution. We also discussed the feasibility of some other file systems, such as NTFS.
• We developed three attacks leveraging the data in external storage. For a victim, an amazing amount of her private information can be acquired by a zero-permission app, her location and even the privacy of her friends are also not spared in our attacks.
• We proposed a relatively practical method to better the privacy protection of external storage, while also guarantee its compatibility with millions of the existing apps and also the OSes ranging from Windows family to Linux family.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We begin with the overview of our research in Section 2, including background, adversary model and the structure of our attacks. Section 3 shows how to acquire users' privacy data and infer their identities. The technique we leveraged to find the owners of the phone numbers are elaborated in Section 4. Section 5 presents how to infer user's location. Our mitigation approach is described in Section 6, and some discussions are covered in Section 7. We compare our work with prior related research in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes this paper.
OVERVIEW

Background of App Data Storage
Android provides five methods for the developers to store data to a device including Shared preferences, Internal storage, External storage, SQLite and Network [29] . In general, apps store the data in two locations, internal storage and external storage. For the internal storage, when an app installed, the system will create a directory of /data/data/<package name> to store several standard subdirectories and some sensitive data generated by the app. By default, the files can only be read by the app itself and even the device owner is prevented from viewing the files unless they have root privilege. Internal storage is more discussed in the field of digital forensic which based on the assumption that researchers hold the smartphones. While in this paper, we focus on external storage since the assumption is totally different.
Nowadays, external storage contains two parts, the emulated SD card embedded in the smartphone and the real SD card inserted by the user. For the old versions of Android (version 4.0 or lower), there is only the permission WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE (WRITE for short) to manage the write operation in external storage, any app can read the data in external storage without any permission. To mitigate potential privacy risks, a new permission READ is introduced from Android 4.1. However, Android must consider the compatibility with existing apps, the permission will be valid only if the user enable "Protect SD card" in the Developer options. From Android 4.4, this option does not exist any more, apps must request READ or WRITE permission if they want to read the data in external storage. It is also worth noting that before Android 4.4, apps can store data in any location they wish in external storage, which can be either the real SD card or the emulated one. However, Android 4.4 has a tighter management on the write privilege of the real SD card, in a nutshell, the permission WRITE is removed from the permission group media_rw.
In order to facilitate mounting the SD card on desktop computers to share files, the external storage is generally formatted with FAT32 file system since it is widely supported and convenient for both developers and users. However, comparing to the ext3/ext4 file system used by the internal storage, FAT32 has a fatal weakness, it lacks the fine grained security mechanism which makes apps can access other apps' data very easily. NTFS seems a more suitable choice due to its better security mechanism and also it supports larger files (more than 4G bytes). To make the current Android support NTFS, people can download an app "Paragon exFAT, NTFS & HFS+" [8] and install on their smartphones, the app in fact is a driver to make apps can access SD card with NTFS. But it requires users' smartphones have been root, obviously, almost no one can accept such a requirement which is filled with risks. Of course, some other reasons also prevent Android using NTFS, such as it wastes a lot of space especially when the partition size is not so large which makes it not suitable for small removable devices. Moreover, NTFS is proposed by Microsoft, therefore, the patent is also a key issue Google need to consider.
The above discussions tell us why even if Google has fully realized the seriousness of the problems exist in external storage, it also can not find an effective solution. All the work has been done is the trade-off among cost, compatibility, availability and privacy.
Resources on External Storage
From the perspective of app developers, the sensitive data (e.g., password) needs to be placed in internal storage, while the data regarded as harmless or occupies a large memory space (e.g., images, videos, audios and etc.) will be put in external storage. These shared resources provide a better flexibility for app developers to develop apps and also more convenient for users to enjoy their fun. For example, a user wants to try another music player on her Android smartphone, the new player can automatically access all the music files stored in the external storage which makes her feel very convenient, especially comparing to iOS. To have a better understanding of the files in external storage and their potential threats, we studied a large number of typical apps from several categories, including social networking, Internet phone calling, online payment, image processing, map navigation, games, and etc. Some basic rules are summarized which pointing out what data apps prefer to store in external storage.
We found most of the apps from social networking and Internet phone calling contain cache, log, account, audio and image files, which are placed in an app's own directory ∼/<package name> (∼ represents the root directory of the emulated SD card which can be obtained by calling API Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory()). The files, like cache, log, lib are common in the external storage of online payment apps. There is no doubt that photos are the main data generated by cameras and also act as the protagonist of image processing apps, of course, the template materials are essential to image processing apps. For map navigation apps, the cache files of maps are the most important data which can reduce the amount of data transmission and even make apps realize off-line navigation. While games contain a variety of files due to their diverse features.
Privacy Risks of External Storage
The attacks against Android remind app developers to take more care of the public resources, including the directories inherited from Linux and the data in external storage. However, it is very hard for app developers to handle the privacy risks of the public directories inherited from Linux, such as /sys, /proc, which need more efforts from Android system developers. App developers should pay more attention on the data generated by the apps themselves, and some approaches have been leveraged to enhance the privacy protection of data in external storage, such as files encryption, using hash values to name folders and files. However, nothing is so perfect, the first thing an app vendor considers is to complete the app faster which can provide more opportunities to take a larger market share, therefore, privacy issues have not got enough attention they deserve, and even ignored by apps from the third-party market [43] .
According to our investigation on various popular apps, we found even the apps from big companies with high credibility are also not so trustworthy. App developers only consider their own convenience and never care the data generated by the app can be leveraged by attackers to combine it with the data from other apps, which can lead to a serious privacy disclosure. For example, we can easily get a user's social networking accounts from external storage. The accounts themselves are meaningless, that are only some random combinations of numbers and characters. But in this paper, we present several ways to get a user's identity by using publicly available information which make these accounts very sensitive.
Adversary Model
We consider an adversary who intends to acquire users' privacy information in a stealthy way, the app developed should transfer the minimum amount of data without any permission. It also needs to conceal its presence from the users and has the capability to bypass the supervision of the secure software installed on smartphones. On the other hand, after the adversary acquires sensitive data from the victims, she can search on the Internet to crawl the publicly available information released by their social networks. Some other techniques are also helpful in our attacks, such as image comparing technique, network capture technique, compilation/decompilation technique, etc. All the corresponding free professional software can be downloaded on the Internet. Finally, we take three different version periods into consideration, including born-4.0, 4.1-4.3, 4.4-present. The statistical result of our questionnaire survey on 148 people who using Android 4.1-4.3 shows an zero-permission app can read other apps' data in external storage with almost 100% success rate, shown in Table 3 . The permission statistical analysis on the 34369 apps described in Table 1 shows the problems have not been addressed even after Android 4.4.
Inferring Identity
Getting Users' Profile information 
Approach Overview
We seek to launch a series of attacks based on the data in external storage that allow us to acquire users' profile information and even infer their friends' privacy information. Figure 1 describes the overview of our design, we carefully analyzed the data in the external storage of various popular apps and found some sensitive data can be leveraged to achieve three different attacks, including getting users' profile information, getting their friends' profile information, and getting users' locations. As Figure 1 shows, acquiring users' privacy data is the cornerstone of our attacks. However, under Android security mechanism, to achieve such a goal without any permission, the app developed by us needs to overcome the following two challenges:
• Finding privacy data. The app needs to have the ability to extract the minimum amount of data from various smartphones, while also keep the integrity of the privacy information we want to acquire.
• Uploading privacy data. The app must have the capability to send data cross the Internet without using the INTERNET permission.
GETTING YOUR PROFILE INFORMA-TION
Finding Privacy Data
In this subsection, we point out what data stored in external storage are sensitive for the target apps studied in this paper. The apps belong to social networking and Internet phone calling are our main targets due to the rich resources they put in external storage, such as the user's personal information, log files, and even her friends' information. Following are detailed descriptions about each app's privacy data.
WhatsApp. It has an interesting feature that if a user views the high definition profile photos of her friends, these photos will be downloaded and saved to the directory ∼/WhatsApp/Profile pictures/, each photo is named by its owner's phone number, such as 852xxxx7777.
Tencent QQ. Under the path ∼/tencent/Mobile QQ/, we can find a folder whose name is the user's account number. It is very convenient for us to acquire a user's QQ profile information by her account number, such as basic information, QQ email, QQ zone, and etc. Moreover, a user's QQ account can also be taken as her WeChat account directly, many people login WeChat just using their QQ accounts and corresponding passwords, especially for WeChat old users. Such a binding mechanism can help us to acquire a user's WeChat profile information through searching her QQ account number.
Renren. We studied two versions of Renren, one is an old version (5.9.4) from the official market, the other is version 7.3.0 which is the latest version downloaded from Renren official website. For the version 5.9.4, a user's UID, real name, email address are all recorded in the file ∼/log/log.txt using plaintext, and the UID can also be got from the name of a folder stored in the path ∼/Renren/account/. Just entering the URL http://www.renren.com/UID in a browser, we can find the user's personal home page which contains a lot of her privacy information, such as name, bio-description, city, university and etc. To protect users' profile information, we could not find any log file in external storage for the new version 7.3.0. However, if a user has used the voice chat function, the audio files stored in the directory ∼/Renren/audio/ were named as the format UID+hash value, which also disclosed the user's UID.
Momo. As a typical location-based social networking app, it mainly focuses on providing dating services for strangers, therefore, the developers pay little attention on the privacy issues. We can find a folder named as the user's account number in the directory ∼/immomo/users/. Through searching the account number, we can not only get her Momo profile information, but also infer her location and even track her.
Alipay. It will expose a user's phone number if she binds her mobile phone number with her Alipay account. In fact, almost all the Alipay users have done such a binding since it makes their shopping more convenient and also more secure. We could find a user's phone number from two cache files, one is the _meta file in the directory ∼/com.eg.android.AlipayGphone/cache/, the data 139xxxx8888_PhoneApp.getPhoneBill a85xxx reveals the user's phone number directly. It also points out the other file a85xxx stored in the same directory which discloses the user's phone number in the form of bindedMobile:139xxxx8888.
Yixin. As an Internet phone calling app, the call records are what we most interested. The file pjsip_log.txt in the directory ∼/Yixin/log/ shows us all the call records information in plaintext. For a specific call, we can find its start time with the flag "mod-pjsua-log" registered. From the IP address received=137.189.xxx.xxx, we can roughly infer where the user made the call by searching whois+IP on Google. The information From:sip:m852xxxx7777@sip.yixin.im tells us the user's phone number and we can get the receiver's phone number from To:sip:139xxxx8888@sip.yixin.im. Finally, the call ended with the flag .PJSUA destroyed, which also helps us to get the call end time.
Camera (build-in). In order to better share the happiness with their friends, and also help them to memory the places they visited, people would like to turn on the GPS when they take photos. But the GPS and time information contained in the photo's EXIF header can also be leveraged to infer when the user appeared at some place.
Email address. Considering some other apps or files put by the user may also disclose the user's email address, the command /system/bin/sh -c grep -r @xxx.com path can be added in our program to match and extract all the email addresses exist in external storage, such as gmail, hotmail, yahoo, qq, 163, etc. To avoid acquiring the duplicate email address and speed up our matching process, the directories belong to the common apps need to be ruled out, like the target apps discussed above.
From the above discussion on each app's privacy data, we can see there exist a certain degree of redundant information for some apps, such as the phone number can be acquired from two cache files in the cache directory of Alipay. In our research, we should select the target privacy data as less as possible and also avoid transmitting the Chinese characters directly.
Identity Inference
In general, we have three methods to get an Android smartphone user's identity, shown as follows:
• A user's identity can be acquired directly from the Renren log file or got from her Renren personal home page by searching her UID.
• A user's identity can be inferred by analyzing the TCP information when Twitter is running and a vector of her tweet timestamps which generated at the same time [44] . The attack also shows 78.63% of people using their real names in Twitter. Most of the time, more detailed profile information, such as city, bio-description, are also included in her Twitter webpage. Similar to Twitter, Weibo which is widely used in China also has the same threat.
• Facebook is certainly a good choice, since it is a very popular social networking app which based on real names. We have two ways to find a user without her real name, one is to search her username, the other is to search her email address. People prefer to use the same username and email address among their various social networking apps, which makes it more easily to be remembered [7] . In our research, through acquiring usernames from the apps mentioned above and extracting email addresses from external storage, we could find someone on Facebook with a high probability. However, for the first method, some other information like place lived is helpful since the username may be not quite the same among different apps, and we'd better register a few fake accounts with the same city to the victims which can improve the recommended accuracy. 
Uploading Privacy Data
In addition to collecting sensitive data we defined in Section 3.1, the app we developed must have the ability to send data cross the Internet without using the INTERNET permission. Leviathan described how to achieve this goal in his blog [14], a zero-permission malicious app on Android can smuggle out data across the Internet through using the URI ACTION_VIEW Intent to open a browser and then sneak the data it wants to deliver to the parameters of an HTTP GET from the receiver website. Unfortunately, this method has a fatal weakness, it can work only when the screen is on which leads the users can aware this abnormal operation very easily. To further make this method practical, Zhou et al. described a more stealthy approach, which can smuggle data right before the screen is off or the screen is being unlocked [44] . In our research, we reimplemented this technique to transmit the sensitive data acquired from external storage to our server.
Direct Attack
In our real attack, we developed a zero-permission malicious app called "Smuggle Android External Storage" (SAES) to acquire and upload the privacy data. Considering people may not install all the target apps discussed in 3.1, SAES takes three steps to complete its function. Firstly, SAES checks whether there exist the critical files in their corresponding directories. Secondly, it extracts the data we interested from these files, and finally, uploading the sensitive data to our server by an HTTP GET. Table 2 shows the sensitive data acquired from a volunteer's (denoted as A) smartphone by SAES, including his real name, phone numbers (one is from Alipay, the other is from Yixin), email addresses (one is from Renren, the other is from grep), various social networking accounts (e.g., QQ, Renren, Momo) and phone numbers of his WhatsApp friends, the time and coordinates information of images tell us when he has taken photos at some place. We also can see when he has called someone from his Yixin log file. Without doubt, this is really a direct and serious privacy disclosure to the volunteer A.
Attack Evaluation
The attack against volunteer A has achieved considerable success. In our research, besides installed SAES on volunteer A, we also installed it on the smartphones of 8 volunteers recruited from our university and denoted as B, C, D, E, F , G, H, I. The Table  1 shows the data acquired from their smartphones. For volunteer C, D, E, F , we could easily get their identities from their Renren information, the identity of G was acquired by her Facebook since she used the same username with Momo, while the email acquired from volunteer I disclosed her Facebook account. Considering the fact that no one wants to share her profile information with all of the world, we can not implement our attack in a large scale. However, as a zero-permission attack which can bypass the secure software (e.g. QQsecure) and also the users' attention, achieving a largescale attack is feasible without doubt.
Based on our study on the security mechanisms of three different version periods, SAES can succeed on all Android smartphones (version 4.0 or lower). For the Android smartphones (version 4.1-4.3), although a new permission READ has been introduced, Android must consider the backward compatibility which leads the permission to be valid only if the user enables "Protect SD card" in the Developer options. However, after conducting a questionnaire survey on 148 Android (version 4.1-4.3) users, we found there are up to 142 users totally didn't notice there exist such an option, since the option is belong to Developer options which seem have nothing to do with normal users. It is true that the rest 6 people have noticed this option, but all the discoveries were unintentional. What's worse, all the 6 people continued to maintain this option at disable state due to such a pop-up reminder "some apps may not work until updated by their developers". This survey fully shows that SAES can succeed to smuggle out the privacy data in external storage of almost all the Android smartphones (version 4.1-4.3).
From Android 4.4, there is no "Protect SD card" option any more, apps must request READ or WRITE permission if they want to read the data in external storage. However, the versions below 4.4 still occupy the vast majority of Android market share. Moreover, we did a statistical analysis on the permissions requested by 34369 apps crawled from Google Play and the third-party market, the results are shown in the Figure 2 , including the top 10 permissions requested by these apps. We took the two permissions READ and WRITE together into consideration, since either one is enough to make apps certainly read all files in external storage. To avoid over counting, we ignored the READ permission if WRITE has been requested. Such a statistical result shows it is acceptable even if the app we developed requests either of the two permissions. Table 1 shows the privacy disclosure risks among the volunteers are very serious. The total number of people using these target apps is shown in Table 3 , which reveals the threats are widely exist on people's Android smartphones. To make our conclusion more persuasive, we also did a questionnaire survey on 200 people in our university which gives a promising result as described in Table 3 .
GETTING YOUR FRIENDS' PROFILE IN-FORMATION
People prefer to use the same photo or take the screenshot of the same picture as their profile photos among various social networking apps. This habit makes it possible for us to distinguish a user through comparing her profile photos. In this section, based on the phone numbers acquired from a user's WhatsApp, we present how to get the profile photos of their owners, and also how we can find the owners' profile information, such as real name, bio-description, and etc.
Getting Profile Photos of Your WhatsApp Friends
WhatsApp is a typical instant messaging app which based on mobile phone numbers. Recent years, it has swept all over the world. After being installed on a smartphone, it will check each phone number in your contact list and automatically add it to your WhatsApp friend list if the phone number has been registered on WhatsApp. In other words, through adding someone's phone number to your contact list, you can get her profile photo even you don't know each other.
We saved the phone numbers acquired from the friends of vol- unteer A as a standard .vcf file and imported this file to create a new contact list on our Android smartphone. Since then, when we launch WhatsApp and click "Select contact", all the people's brief profile information will appear on the screen. Therefore, it is very easy for us to view someone's "contact info" and click the thumb to download her HD profile photo to the directory ∼/WhatsApp/Profile Pictures/. These steps are truly simple, but they need to be repeated thousands of times. To make our attack have the ability to achieve a large scale deployment, we need find an automated approach to perform these repeated operations since it is impossible for an attacker to click the smartphone like a machine. Fortunately, with the help of monkeyrunner provided by Android, we can write a script to simulate these operations. The script has three main tasks in our real attack, including importing .vcf files, downloading profile photos, and launching an app we developed to upload the photos, all these photos are stored in the WhatsApp gallery on our server. Through the above processes controlled by the script, we have automatically transferred all the 12 profile photos stored in volunteer A's smartphone to our server just using the names of these photos. Figure 3 shows the screenshot of these photos.
Crawling Photos from Social Networks
Social networks have been increasingly gain the popularity and various apps keep springing up. In our research, we need not only a user's profile information, but also her real life friends circle. Throughout various popular social networking apps, Facebook, Twitter, Renren, and Weibo become our best choice. However, in this paper, we focus on Facebook and Renren, since the attack against Twitter requires the cooperation with the directories inherited from Linux, such as /proc/uid_stat/[uid]/tcp_snd, which is out the scope of this paper.
Our goal is to crawl all profile photos of volunteer A's friends from his Facebook and Renren personal home page. What we need do is to write a crawler running on our desktop to crawl these photos and set each photo's name as her username or UID, which makes it easier for us to find the owner afterwards. We developed two crawlers in our attack, one is for Facebook, the other is for Renren, 
Figure 5: The Profile Photos of Renren Friends (only part)
which make the crawlers more targeted. Figure 4 shows the profile photos of volunteer A's Facebook friends, while the profile photos of his Renren friends are shown in Figure 5 . Both the two figures only display part of the photos due to the number of photos is really a little large. So far, we have acquired all the profile photos of volunteer A's friends from the two social networking apps, photos from each app were stored in a folder named by the app's name, and the two folders were put into a new gallery named by an unique id assigned by the crawler.
Comparing Photos
Comparing pictures by similarity is a hot research direction in image processing field. People can download various free professional software from the Internet, such as PictureRelate, Image Comparer, Visual Similarity Duplicate Image Finder and etc. In general, the functions of these software are very similar. However, considering the actual situation of our research, we choose PictureRelate as our tool mainly for its two features, one is that PictureRelate is faster than other similar software since it only leverages the basic image properties and combines them in a weighted way to classify images, such a simple method avoids using complex and highly time consuming image processing algorithms, the other is that we can adjust the weight of each feature very easily, this flexibility can help us to achieve the best result among various situations. In this attack, color, saturation, and brightness need to possess a greater weight, while the effects of time, size, text stamped, and format can be ignored.
After each feature was set at a reasonable weight, we import photos from WhatsApp gallery and Facebook gallery into PictureRelate, the similar two pictures could be easily picked out since they appeared in the adjacent positions and arranged in the front of all pictures. We repeated the same process on WhatsApp gallery and Renren gallery to find out the similar pictures. Of course, sometimes we were not so lucky to find the similar pictures, for such a situation, some manual efforts can help us to find which two photos are belong to the same person. Table 4 shows the results of our comparisons. We have not done the manual comparison between WhatsApp and Renren due to it was really a time consuming and labor work. According to the name of the similar photo found in either Facebook gallery or Renren gallery, we visited her corresponding home page. In addition to acquire her identity, more privacy information could be acquired from her "About" information on Facebook, such as Work and Education, Places Lived, Basic Information, Life Events, and Contact Information, which are also shown in Table  4 . Although the similar privacy information can also be obtained from people's Renren home page, we did not do this in our research because of the information on Renren is much less than Facebook. It is true that some users are likely to set access permissions for strangers which prevents us accessing the detailed personal information, but the exposure of their identities is inevitable, and these detailed personal information are icing on the cake in our research. Table 4 shows that 9 owners have been found out from all the 12 phone numbers, including 8 owners found by PictureRelate, and manual efforts revealed another owner's identity. Without doubt, the success rate is relatively high, because if someone appears in your phone contact list, she has a very high probability would be your social networking friend, especially if you are young people.
Attack Evaluation
we repeated such an attack on another 5 volunteers since we failed to acquire profile photos from volunteers F and H, while we also could not get the identity of volunteer B. In order to show our approach can achieve a large-scale deployment, we only leveraged PictureRelate to match similar pictures since manual operations are actually not practical. The results are shown in Table 5 , the overall success rate for the 5 volunteers is 55.6% (20/36), which is also quite considerable. Certainly, it can be further improved by face recognition and image analysis techniques, but a complex method would make the comparing process much slower.
In addition to acquiring the above privacy information, we had an interesting finding that the phone number of volunteer D (acquired from Yixin) appeared in volunteer C's WhatsApp friend list, which means the comparing method even can be leveraged to infer people's identity. In our research, although 29 phone numbers have been acquired, which were actually 23 different phone numbers since one phone number could be acquired from different people. Such a redundance can be leveraged to construct another friends circle which is certainly more sensitive comparing to the social networking friends circles. It is also very valuable since some people may not use social networking platforms, like Facebook and Renren, but most of them still use WhatsApp, Wechat, etc.
GETTING YOUR LOCATION
Nowadays, many social networking apps provide an interesting service for people to make friends based on their locations. In addition to providing more fun to people, such a feature also brings the users' locations to serious privacy breaches. The attacks developed to steal users' locations were often reported in recent years. However, these attacks were either based on the assumption that the attackers have known the victim's basic information, such as identity, social networking accounts, or only developed to make advertising more targeted which makes attackers only need to focus on people's locations without knowing their true identities.
In this paper, the assumption of our attack is totally different, because the victims' identities were also inferred by our previous attack which makes our approach more general and more convenient to be deployed at a large-scale. Momo and WeChat were leveraged to infer users' locations since we have acquired the two accounts in Section 3.
Momo
In terms of Momo, a typical location-based social networking app, no matter how far between an attacker and a victim, the attacker can get the distance directly through searching her account number, which makes the attacks against Momo are very easy to implement. Various attacks have been discussed from different perspective, such as improving accuracy [32] , large scale measurement study [18] , etc. In general, almost all these location inferring attacks have been achieved by mocking GPS locations on Android emulators or real smartphones, and the classic three point positioning method has been leveraged by attackers to calculate the victim's location. To obtain a certain accuracy, some iterative algorithms are introduced by researchers. For Momo, a relatively accurate location can be achieved only after several iterations which benefited from its fast convergent rate merit [32] .
Attack Settings. In our research, we tried to install Momo on the emulators (both ARM and X86), but version 4.9 and even the PC version could not be launched even we have modified the IMEI of an emulator, while the version 4.6 could be launched but failed to login due to it is too old. Although the version 4.9 can be launched on a real Android smartphone, it will stop working if it detects we enable the "Allow mock locations" option. To address this limitation, we installed an app called "Fake GPS location" [3] on our smartphone and set the access right of the directory /system as rw since the default is ro, through moving "com.lexa.fakegps-1.apk" from /data/app to /system/app, Momo works properly even we fake the GPS to different locations. We also enabled the "GPS satellites" option in Location services to let apps use GPS to pinpoint the location. Meanwhile, the "Google's location service" option was disabled to limit determining the approximate location using data from WiFi and mobile networks, such a setting also could avoid keeping faked location even after stopping the app.
Reading Information Displayed on the Screen. We intend to find a method which can work on various apps to get the information displayed on the screens. This problem can not be resolved by some classic methods, like repackaging apps, OCR technique, since the former is not a scalable method which needs our efforts for each different app, while the latter is effective only on a specific language but according to our observation, the information on the screens always contains several languages and even some special symbols. Moreover, OCR technique is not suitable to process a large scale data due to it is really very inefficient. After deliber- ate analysis, we chose to modify Android system. With the help of Baksmali/Smali, we added a log command in the framework.jar to dump the text information whenever the "setText" method in the "android.widget.TextView" is called.
Attack Evaluation. Table2 and Table 1 show the Momo accounts have been acquired, including volunteer A, C, F , G, I. In our research, we chose a few railway stations and set them as the history locations of "Fake GPS location", these railway stations should cover the main places and try to avoid more than two stations in a line. We wrote a monkeyrunner script to fake our GPS to different railway stations one by one and got the three shortest distances from the log file through matching the victim's Momo account. With the help of a program which implements the classic three point positioning algorithm, the distances and their corresponding GPS coordinates could be leveraged to calculate the victim's location. To make our approach more intuitive, Figure  6 describes how we can get a user's location in a figurative way. The timestamps combined with the distances show each location calculated in fact was the place a user stayed at some time ago, and sometimes we could not get a user's location since she set Momo at incognito mode.
We have attacked 5 volunteers at different time, which continued through half a month. The top 2 locations each volunteer appeared largely revealed her work and home place which was really a serious privacy disclosure. Comparing the locations we calculated with the real locations of the volunteers, we found our results have certain deviations, but the accuracy was quite acceptable since the precision is not what we most care about, and further improving the accuracy is also feasible. For example, with a more complex algorithm, the authors of [32] achieved a considerable accuracy.
WeChat
Comparing to Momo, the attack against WeChat is totally different, since you can not get the distance between you and the victim just using her account information, which makes our attack more challenging. Our approach can succeed mainly benefited from the feature that anyone can see the people near her through an interesting WeChat function called People Nearby.
Getting Users' WeChat Information
There are two ways for a user to have a WeChat account, one is to bind with her QQ account, the other is to register by her phone number. Table 2 and Table 1 show the QQ accounts and phone numbers acquired from 8 volunteers (except volunteer I), but we only took 6 volunteers as our targets due to the identity information of volunteer B and H has not been acquired. 23 different phone numbers acquired from the volunteers' friends which shown in Table 4 and Table 5 were also our targets. For a specific user, just searching her QQ account or phone number, we can very easily get her WeChat profile information, such as profile photo, nickname, region and etc. However, in addition to these information, we seek to find a user's unique identity since it is necessary in our later process. The WeChat ID is obviously our best choice, but we can not get a user's WeChat ID just through searching her QQ account or phone number, since it can be seen only by her friends.
Generating a New Unique ID for Each User. When searching a QQ account or phone number, "Shark for Root" [10] was triggered to intercept the network traffics at the same time. We acquire users' information by analyzing the pcap file. Taking volunteer A as an example, in addition to obtaining her profile photo, we found the size and last modified time of this photo, like Content-Length:965, Last-Modified:Thu, 26 Sep 2013 13:43:54 GMT. These two information can be leveraged to generate a new unique ID called TimeSize ID as the format: year+month+day+time+size, (e.g., the TimeSize ID of volunteer A is 20130926134354965). Such a simple format can speed up the later comparison process between the victims' TimeSize IDs and the IDs acquired from People Nearby. It is impossible for two people to upload their profile photos at the same time, while the photos also have the same size. Of course, the thumb itself can be taken as a kind of identity information, but this will make our attack more complex, since we need not only to write a script to acquire the thumbs and also to calculate a hash value for each thumb. What's worse, the thumb is too small, no one can guarantee the entropy of a thumb is enough to distinguish more than 600 million WeChat users [13] .
Creating a Database. We wrote a monkeyrunner script to search the 6 volunteers' QQ account numbers and another 23 phone numbers one by one. We are so lucky to get all the 6 volunteers' WeChat profile information by their QQ account numbers, otherwise, we need to try their phone numbers. For another 23 phone numbers, 12 people's profile information has been acquired. The log file revealed no matter if QQ account number or phone number has been registered on WeChat, which has been leveraged to map each profile information acquired from the pcap file to the right person. These IDs and their corresponding nicknames extracted from the log file are stored in a database, which is shown in Table 6 . To make the database easier to update, we managed the database based on the region acquired from the log file. In general, the region is a district of a city.
Updating the Database. We need to update a user's information timely if she changed her profile information.
• Profile photo changed only. For each person acquired from People Nearby, no matter whether she appears in the database or not, we need to compare her nickname with the ones stored in the database belong to the same region and decide whether we need to retrieve her TimeSize ID again. It is worthy noting that the frequency a user changes her nickname is much lower than she updates her profile photo.
• Nickname and region changed at least one. When we detect a victim in the database appeared at some place, we need to check whether she has changed her nickname or region.
• Profile photo changed, nickname and region changed at least one. We update each user's information after her last update in a fixed time interval, the time slot is decided by the statistics information of the people in the same region. For example, through faking GPS to different places in our region, we acquired information from 977 different people and calculated how long ago they 
Getting Information from People Nearby
Similar to acquire profile information from the volunteers, "Shark for Root" has been leveraged to intercept the network traffics when using People Nearby. Intuitively, we can get all the TimeSize IDs of the people displayed on the screen from the corresponding pcap file, but in practical, we need consider the cache mechanism of Android. The information max-age=2592000 shows each thumb will keep as long as a month. Such a mechanism in fact can reduce our workload since we will not receive the same TimeSize ID again. However, after detecting that someone in the database appeared at some place or updating the TimeSize ID database, we can delete the directory ∼/tencent/MicroMsg to clear all the cache files and also need completely stop WeChat to clear the data cached in the RAM, which makes sure we get real-time results.
Mapping Each TimeSize ID to the Right Distance. After having detected someone we interested, we automatically get the distance by matching her nickname with the ones acquired from the log file, since we only consider the people appear in People Nearby, a user's nickname should have enough entropy to be distinguished in less than 100 people.
Attack Evaluation
Scanning Like a Radar. We set the railway stations in two districts (Tai Po and Shatin) of our city as the history locations of "Fake GPS location", for the densely populated places, we added another anchor points since People Nearby only shows the limited people. A monkeyrunner script has been developed to automatically complete the scanning process, for each point, to load all the people's information appeared in People Nearby, the script continuously press KEYCODE_DPAD_DOWN until to the last one. To avoid discovered by Tencent, the script sleeps a while before changing to a new anchor point. If someone in our database appeared in the list of People Nearby, another WeChat will be launched to get new distances by mocking its GPS to another two locations near the place we detect her. We can very easily calculate her location using these data acquired by a similar method used in the attack against Momo users. Such a work also can be done on emulators which makes it possible to achieve a larger scale attack, since a cluster of computers is easy to find nowadays.
We have attacked 6 volunteers and their 12 friends at different time, which also continued through half a month. The top 2 locations of each volunteer have been acquired, while it is a little difficult for the 12 friends since they totally did not know they have been targeted by us. Our results show that the locations of 5 people have been missed since they might never use People Nearby in our experimental period, or the unreasonable distribution of our anchor points. However, 7 out of 12 is really a great result in such a situation. For the attack against WeChat, finding the people we interested from the boundless crowds is our core aim, while the precision is really not what we most care about, and as discussed in the evaluation part of Section 5.1, many methods can be leveraged to further improve the measurement accuracy.
DEFENSE
Given the fact that millions of apps exist in the market, the attacks discovered in our research are obviously just a tip of the iceberg. An immediate defense against our attacks is to prevent an app from reading the data generated by other apps which stored in external storage. However, this approach is not practical because it will undermine the basic functions of many existing apps, privacy protection should not be achieved at the expense of compatibility and availability. To achieve a better balance between app utility and data protection, we proposed a hybrid approach to fix these information leaks.
Trusting Reputable Apps. Although the reputable apps themselves may exist information leakage, like the target apps in this paper, they should not steal privacy data from other apps. The effectiveness of the two permissions READ and WRITE will not be changed for these apps. In general, the reputable apps are consist of the common apps used in our daily life which are released by reliable companies. The users are disallowed to decide whether an app is a reputable one, since the decisions made by users are always unreliable, and malicious apps can guide people to make wrong decisions.
User-driven Access Control Mechanism. For the non-reputable apps, they are forbidden to access other apps' data directly, even the permission READ or WRITE has been explicitly declared in the AndroidManifest.xml file. The user-driven access control mechanism is introduced to resolve the resources sharing problem. Considering some apps need to read all the files with a specific type in external storage, like picture viewer, music player, video player, the system can organize the same type of files together (only for pictures, music files, video files), which will make the apps access their target files more easily.
DISCUSSION
The attacks achieved in this paper reveal the privacy risks of external storage are much more serious than Google thought before. In fact, Google has been trying to make up for its fault, such as the introduction of permission READ from 4.1 and enforcing it must be requested from 4.4, but they do not really solve the problem. To address such an urgent problem, more efforts need to devoted by Google, since Android is an open platform which makes us can not pin our hope on the app developers.
Limitations and future work. Throughout this paper, our main focus is how to steal the sensitive data and infer privacy. The attacks achieved on volunteers and their friends show the feasibility of a large scale deployment, but the amount of the volunteers is not enough. However, our questionnaire survey on 200 people in our university gives a positive result, which shows the possibility of achieving a large scale implementation is quite high. Sometimes Momo could not operate very well, therefore, registering a few fake accounts is useful to avoid targeted by the social networking companies. In addition to the attacks discovered in this paper, in the future, based on the information acquired from users, clone attacks are likely to be implemented, a large scale and continuous analysis on the behaviors of WeChat users is also possible. We can even try to attack WhatsApp users at a city level through faking phone numbers in a city and crawling profile photos from people's social networks in the same city.
RELATED WORK
Stealing Users' Data. The photos taken and stored on our mobile phones capture our daily lives in detail which contain some private information we want to protect. But unfortunately, as reported in [6] , Android apps can secretly upload your photos to their own servers without you knowing about it. Coincidentally, a similar security hole in WhatsApp has been uncovered by Bas Bosschert [11] , which can be leveraged to steal the private chats of Android device owners since all chats are stored on the SD card. However, both the two attacks have the same fatal weakness that they need the INTERNET permission due to a large amount of data transmission.
Attacks on Users' Profile Information. Combining the TCP information when Twitter is running and the tweets' timestamps together, Zhou et al. [44] proposed a new method to infer a user's identity. Goga et al. [27] studied how potential they can identify accounts on different social network sites that all belong to the same user. The authors of [40] showed that group memberships presented on many social networks can be leveraged to uniquely identify users. Balduzzi et al. [15] correlated accounts on different social networks by exploiting the friend finder mechanism with a huge number of email addresses. Some widely available face recognition software was leveraged by Polakis et al. [34] to complete authentications, that is identifying some randomly selected photos of a user's friends. Through automated crawling users' personal information, Bilge et al. [16] showed the feasibility of profile cloning attacks in popular social network sites.
Location Attacks. The authors of [38] showed a set of location traces can be de-anonymized through correlating their contact graph with the graph of a social network in spite of the data has been obfuscated. Based on a large-scale data set of call records, Zang et al. [41] proposed an approach to infer the "top N" locations for each user, their results showed the top three locations almost can be uniquely identified. Zheng et al. [42] discovered the interesting locations and some possible activities that can be performed by analyzing users' comments at various locations. Tweets, articles, Flickr photos, videos also can be leveraged to infer users' locations, which have been discussed in [31, 28, 19, 20, 25] .
Privacy Protection. To have a better access control of the data stored on smartphones, user-driven access control mechanism has been proposed by Roesner et al. [36] , while in [33] , the authors discussed how to achieve a fine-grained access control. Enck et al. [21] developed "TaintDroid" to prevent users' private data being abused by third party apps. Zhou et al. [46] combined the permission based behavioral footprinting scheme and the heuristics-based filtering scheme together to detect malicious apps, their team also did a systematic study on repackage apps [43] and characterized the existing Android malware [45] . Various methods were proposed by researchers to protect users' location information [26, 37, 35] , while the approaches of privacy preserving in social networking were discussed in [22, 39, 23] .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed three different attacks by leveraging the data in external storage. The privacy data acquired by a zeropermission app leaks highly sensitive data of an Android user, like real name, phone number, email address, location and etc. Moreover, the privacy of users' friends are also not spared in the disaster. Such serious privacy risks warn app developers that they should take privacy problems more seriously. We also point out that the root reason which leads to such highly risks of external storage is a wrong trade-off made by Google between privacy and compatibility at the beginning of system design. This is why Google could not find an effective solution even if it was perfectly aware of its design fault. To the end, we proposed a preliminary method to better the privacy protection of external storage on Android, while guarantee its compatibility with the existing apps and the OSes ranging from Windows family to Linux family at the same time.
